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thought to be wholly dependent upon what will be offered to the student by
way of information and technical discipline in subsequent more specialized
courses in public law.
THOMAS REED POWELLt
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPIEME COURT. By Samuel Hendel.
King's Crown Press. 1951.
"A Chief Justice cannot escape history," Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote
in a tribute to Harlan F. Stone. But history has its deceptions and ironies, and
not the least of these is that, within the past year, a biographer of a dull Chief
Justice has made him interesting and a biographer of an interesting Chief
Justice has made him dull. The first of these biographers was Mr. Willard
King whose facile and loving pen made of Fuller's life and times a fascinating
tale.1 The second of these biographers, alas, is Mr. Hendel who, although he
approaches his task with erudition and scholarship, has produced a soporific.
Mr. Hendel, unlike Mr. King, writes of Hughes only through the medium
of his opinions, with the exception of a little interspersed biographical ma-
terial, and he has laboriously strung out the facts of and quotations from
these cases in page after page of doctrinal discussion. Although unquestion-
ably the two authors had different objectives in mind, one cannot help but com-
pare this biography with the shorter, far more lively, and I think more infor-
mative article by Mr. McElwain. 2 One example will suffice. Mr. Hendel has
elaborately set out Hughes' opinions on civil liberties to prove that "Most note-
worthy, perhaps, were his decisions affecting civil liberties and rights of mi-
norities."13 But in the bitter-sweet story of Bob White v. Texas4-an opinion
which the Chief Justice did not even write-Mr. McElwain has described more
succinctly and certainly much more interestingly Hughes' civil liberties attitude.5
The difficulty perhaps with Mr. Hendel's. book is that judicial biography
should not be approached as he attempts it. To try to unravel all the doctrinal
lace'of a long tenure on the Court is appropriate only for an antiquarian. It
is clearly suitable to discuss, as Mr. Hendel does, the Chief Justice's position
with respect to Adkins v. Children's Hospital,' Morehead v. People ex rel.
Tipaldo,7 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish;" for those important cases, as
clearly as any, show Hughes' ability to distinguish, compromise, and finally
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adjust. But to ask the reader to be interested in decisions like Grand Trunk
Western R.R. v. South Bend,9 New York Electric Lines Co. v. Empire City
Subway System,'0 and Russell v. Sebastian" is surely too great a demand.'
2
Moreover, there is little justification for the book in its present form. If Mr.
Hendel is interested-as appears the case-in the constitutional doctrine and
development during Hughes' time as an Associate Justice and then as a Chief
Justice, then surely that subject cannot be adequately studied through the
opinions of Hughes alone. If, on the other hand, he is interested in Hughes
as a person and as a judge, then he must probe far deeper. For often--and
this indeed was the case with Hughes'--the opinions of a Justice are no more
indicative of his labors and contributions than is a violinist's virtuosity indica-
tive of the hours spent in practicing.
Lengthy comment of Mr. Hendel's remarks concerning the power of the
Court to declare legislation unconstitutional is not necessary. Like many others
he favors that power as it relates to state legislation but not as to federal
legislation The logical-and I think even more than logical, govern-
mental-absurdity of that position has not always been pointed out. Adop-
tion of it would mean that although the Court would one day strike down
as unconstitutional a state statute under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it could not the following day declare unconstitu-
tional an identical statute passed by the Federal Government, although the
Fifth Amendment contains precisely the same clause. And to deprive the
Court of the power to hold federal legislation unconstitutional might give
Congress the power, at least in many instances, to efiable the states to pass
legislation which otherwise would be invalid. I am afraid that Chief Justice
Hughes' unhappy times, constitutionally speaking, have exerted too great
an influence on Mr. Hendel. All institutions are subject to abuse, and the
three branches of our government have from time to time been abused. But
Mr. Hendel wants to tinker without thinking hard or deeply enough.
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